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Introduction: where politics happens 
 
In a recent memoir by Carrie Brownstein (2015), the Sleater-Kinney guitarist writes 
about the suffocating conformism that came to characterise the Riot Grrrl movement 
from which the band emerged. Her frustration stems from the painful irony that this 
was a subculture whose origins were anything but stifling, both visceral and committed 
to carving out new ways of thinking about and beyond gender. Riot Grrrl ossified as it 
grew, with self-appointed gatekeepers always on the lookout for transgressions of 
mostly unspoken rules, and Brownstein found herself increasingly alienated in a world 
that had once felt like home.     
 
To read across from this observation to contemporary protest movements is not glibly 
to suggest that despite voiced commitments to openness and inclusivity online activist 
cultures have tended towards the exclusive and intolerant. Instead, the takeout is a by-
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product of both the drive of those involved and the fervour of the academics who study 
them. It can be explained in terms of Bourdieu’s field theory (1993). As with any newly 
burgeoning area of activity, or with the ascendancy of a new generation of practitioners, 
it is not just that new conventions are established and sacred cows overturned. Also at 
stake are the rules of the game, in this case what counts as the meaningful practice and 
study of protest and other kinds of political activism. The result is that a subset of a 
culture of practice comes to stand for the whole – a synecdoche, like ‘the Kremlin’ 
standing in as the subject of a sentence in a news bulletin about Russian government 
policy, or the eye coming to represent everything involved in the act of looking. More 
than shorthand or symbolism, the part becomes the whole – a natural progression for 
field insiders, a cause for concern with outsiders mindful of what might be lost in the 
process. 
 
This can be put more precisely by way of Nick Couldry’s (2003) myth of the mediated 
centre of society, more recently (2015) transposed to social media as the myth of ‘us’. By 
this Couldry refers to two specific risks as media institutions become embedded among 
the rhythms and routines of everyday life. The first risk is assuming that whatever goes 
on in these media, in this case anything academics observe on social media platforms, is 
direct evidence of wider political realities. Several of the authors in these volumes 
anticipate this caution, drawing on Andrejevic (2002; 2012), and Fuchs (2013; 2014) to 
aver that the last thing posts on social media are is representative of reality: indeed they 
are nothing more than the overdetermined products of the commercial, or neoliberal, 
logics that drive the design, promotion and management of these platforms. Happily, the 
chapters under review here run the gamut from one pole to the other, and seen in the 
round a defensible middle ground just about emerges – one where as much as we 
cannot assume that what is observed in social media is an authentic expression of 
political reality (Dencik, in Dencik & Leistert), nor can we responsibly reduce it to 
incited labour demanded by corporate tech behemoths. Epistemology matters, and the 
academic field of protest studies is anything but consistent in its application. 
 
The second risk Couldry identifies lies in accepting that media are where meaningful 
things happen these days – more specifically for us, that social media are where politics 
happens now. More than crowding out other political spaces worthy of attention and 
investigation, we run the risk of losing sight of ways of thinking about politics that 
developed through academic engagement with them. At first glance there is nothing to 
worry about here, with the canonical texts of protest studies well represented across the 
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three volumes: Gramsci, Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari, Hardt and Negri, Laclau and 
Mouffe are all in rude health, if health consists in citations. There is, though, evidence of 
what Couldry writing with José van Dijck (2015) describe as forgetting what we used to 
mean by the social before social media came along. Plenty of the work presented is 
nutritious, sturdy and insightful, but there is also a pervading sense of things that can be 
safely assumed, things it goes without saying about what happens when people use 
social media – and perhaps when social media use them. The result is an inevitable 
subsequence of specialisation: tunnel vision, though to the editors’ credit several 
tunnels are on offer. What is often missing is an awareness of what else is going on 
around politically motivated social media practice. 
 
Implicated selves of social networks 
 
A corollary to the argument that social media politics is not simply the new politics in its 
entirety or purest or most developed form is that for individuals engaged in online and 
offline activism the stakes are not as high as is sometimes claimed. This is by no means 
to downplay the efficacy of or personal investment in various causes, simply that it is as 
speculative to presume that someone will realise her political subjectivity most fully in 
mediated networks as it is to begin from the supposition that her subjectivity is under 
existential threat from the economic and institutional logics of social media platforms. 
However much someone is engaged in politics or immersed in media cultures, and 
however much each demands to be apprehended as a fully-formed, always-already 
world, that someone’s whole being-in-the-world is not really at stake. This derives from 
Paddy Scannell’s (1996) phenomenological take on television: when we switch the thing 
on we are confronted not just with content but whole worlds of frames, reference 
points, temporalities and value systems that insist on being grasped as they are and in 
toto. Further, this world of television demands that we engage with it as a particular 
kind of self – one that understands not only the natural meaningfulness of media genres 
but scheduling sequences and cycles, the hierarchies of a news broadcast, and how to 
recognise an authoritative source. 
 
This gets political when news cultures are thrown into the mix. Now, the world into 
which someone is thrown every time they turn on the 10 o’clock news is one whose 
parameters are not only mechanical and value-laden but discursive, shaped by ways of 
knowing about events that are caught up in the deep structures and structural 
reproduction of society, and economic logics to boot. Echoes of this line of thinking are 
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there across these collections, most transparently in the political economy perspective 
that forms the backbone of the Trottier and Fuchs volume and is well-represented 
elsewhere, but also, interestingly, in the many papers cleaving to the transformative 
power of protest (see especially Lovink & Rossiter, in Dencik & Leistert). It is refreshing 
to see such consistent ambivalence about the instrumental efficacy of social media 
networks (for instance Porto & Brant, in Dencik & Leistert), but the world of resistance 
and dissent is depicted as every bit as enveloping as Scannell’s television world – 
prefigurative and generative, yet morally replete, unimpeachable and irresistible (see 
for instance de Bakker, in Uldam & Verstergaard; Cammaerts, in Uldam & Verstergaard; 
Hintz, in Dencik & Leistert; Della Porta & Mattoni, in Trottier & Fuchs). Dogma and 
ideological obedience are anachronistic in online protest cultures and are more or less 
absent in these volumes, but their value systems, whether explicit or implicit, are 
nonetheless insistent and always-already everywhere. 
 
For Scannell, though, while the selves called forth in media encounters are multiply 
implicated in technological affordances, moral systems and relations of power, they are 
also partial. This means that while navigating media might require a naturalised 
orientation to a world operating by commercial principles, this is not the same as either 
a neoliberal assault on otherwise authentic selves (Leistert, in Dencik & Leistert), or as 
the summoning into existence of compulsory neoliberal selves (Redden, in Dencik & 
Leistert). It is certainly possible that immersion in particular media cultures could start 
to supplant other modes of being, but it is not a zero-sum contest between alternate 
subjectivities, some self-evidently better than others. Rather, in a manner closer to 
Goffman (1972) than Deleuze (1995), the repertoires people learn and ultimately 
embody as they feel their way through media worlds are just that: they may feed into 
your sense of who you are, but they neither displace some originary self nor carve out 
space for radically new ones. To be wilfully prosaic about it, it varies from platform to 
platform and cause to cause. Our job is methodically to disaggregate and weigh up the 
implications of social media for the ways in which people think and act politically, 
whether as individuals or collectively. 
 
Judith Butler points one way forward in this regard. The kind of incitement detailed in 
Bodies That Matter (1993) is a strictly coercive kind of selfhood, one that is fiendishly 
difficult to shake off, and one to which there isn’t an obviously preferable alternative in 
any case. But in later works such as Excitable Speech (1997) she cautiously opens up a 
few crevices by asking precisely what kinds of subjectification are at work when 
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someone comes to adopt certain ways of dressing or walking, as well as how we are 
interpellated – called forth as specifically implicated selves – by institutions. Van Dijck 
likewise works outwards from case studies to broader theses, with The Culture of 
Connectivity (2013) divided into chapters focussing on different social media platforms 
without dragging normative baggage from one to the next. Like Scannell she very much 
has in mind the unsolicited, usually unacknowledged interpellation of new kinds of self – 
this is how she theorises the observation that we adapt ourselves to the logics and 
affordances of new media forms as much as we adapt them to suit our interests, needs 
and desires. Resisting a more heavy-handed approach, however, she suggests that we 
would do well to be a bit more historical about particular social media platforms and 
what their adoption embeds as normal over time. 
 
Discourses of socially mediated protest 
 
So the point of this review is not to devise another definitive conceptualisation of social 
media activism and mediated politics more broadly, but to question some currently 
dominant ways of knowing and thinking about it all. The breadth of topics is 
remarkable, ranging well beyond the totems of Occupy, Los Indignados and the Arab 
uprisings. The intellectual curiosity across disciplines and theoretical traditions is 
likewise impressive, and a keen sense of the need to be sensitive to political and 
temporal context pervades (see especially Dencik & Leistert, in Dencik & Leistert; Porto 
& Brant, in the same volume. Kaun, in Uldam & Vestergaard, points out that ‘Occupy’ has 
distinctly negative connotations in countries that have experienced the other kind of 
occupation). Nonetheless, by further de-universalising ways of knowing about social 
media politics manifest across much of the literature, we can start to ask else what else 
might be going on here. Something that is clear from this sample is that we have moved 
on from mapping out perspectives on social media between two opposing camps of 
optimists and pessimists: references to early influential publications by Clay Shirky and 
Evgeny Morozov are, on this evidence, finally on the wane. There remains a fairly clear 
bifurcation, but one with a fulcrum in the form of the still divisive figure of Manuel 
Castells. 
 
This is progress of sorts and there is little straw-manning of Castells, with a broad 
understanding that his mass communication of the self (2009; 2012) is neither a 
celebration of individualism that he invites you to sign up to or hiss at, nor the 
valorisation of solipsism and parochialism as which it is sometimes written off. The 
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conceptual work that mass self-communication was devised to do is not so much to 
argue in defence of or against the social mediatisation of politics and activism, but 
instead to attempt to supersede the individual/collective binary altogether. As such 
Castells is just the latest in a long and rich theoretical tradition that stretches back 
through Bourdieu ultimately to Hegel. In practice, it means that his creative audience is 
not some kind of magic, collective generativeness. It looks almost mundane in some 
sections of Communication Power (2009): a community of users that is able to respond, 
adapt and build on new, potentially heterogenous voices in a way which does not 
subsume or annihilate those individuals as a necessity of collective political subjectivity 
and expression. It appears that what raises hackles in some quarters (see for instance 
Cammaerts, Uldam & Vestergaard) is not that Castells is an apologist for the consumerist 
narcissism some diagnose in social media cultures. Rather, and this may be the opposite 
side of the same coin to his critics, it is that he is comfortable situating the individual as 
logically prior to the collective when it comes to politicality. An individual that precedes 
and survives the formation of political consciousness and movements is incompatible, 
for them, with how progressive politics works. 
 
In order to test this proposition, academics have deployed both theorisations and 
empirical explorations of social media political activism to determine whether there is 
something qualitatively different about communities in which individuals remain intact, 
only partially implicated in the causes around which they are active. Elsewhere (Juris, 
2012) this has been dubbed the politics of aggregation, but here the most commonly 
cited exemplar is that paper, and subsequent book, by W. Lance Bennett and Alexandra 
Segerberg (2012; 2013) which distinguishes collective political action of the kind seen in 
earlier activism up to and including the listserv culture that thrived in the 
antiglobalisation movements around the turn of the century, from the connective action 
seen in social media activism. This work is frequently used to back up claims about the 
fissiparous nature of social media activist networks, but Bennett emphasises in a 
foreword to the Uldam & Vestergaard volume that their aim was to challenge the very 
conception of media as mass communication. Looked at one way this is no different than 
reconceptualising media as, say, practice, but there is something distinctly fruitful about 
thinking of media primarily as organisational processes, the means for allocating 
resources, assigning roles, adapting tactics and strategy in response to events (see also 
Treré, in Dencik & Leistert). The subtext here is that we should be less preoccupied with 
asking whether social media are capable of generating new political imaginaries and 
long-term commitment: that is not their job. 
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Whether social media activism is capable of producing or sustaining collective political 
subjectivity remains an open question, as it should be. For all the possible new ways of 
being political being opened up and embraced, it does us a service to be warned that 
these novel configurations might lack something of what we used to understand by 
collectivity, commitment and solidarity (Castelló & Barberá, in Uldam & Vestergaard; 
Husted, in the same volume; Lovink & Rossiter, in Dencik & Leistert). Jess Baines’ 
chapter in the Uldam and Vestergaard volume, on community print shops in 1970s 
London, stands out not just for its historicity but for its clarity and colour – it also 
foreshadows Brownstein’s experience in detailing the exclusive, disciplinary side of DIY 
politics. The essential point, though, is that as with previous incarnations of the 
individual/collective dialectic, that offered up by Castells and by Bennett and Segerberg 
ultimately boils down to normative propositions. Whether all practice including activist 
politics is ultimately determined by and oriented towards structural reproduction, or 
whether it carries within it the possibility of transformation, cannot be derived from 
first principles after all. This is a good thing: academic discourse around protest should 
be about principles and ethics. It suggests, though, that it is proper to put motivation 
under the spotlight and to do so in a way that does not reduce all political participation 
to self-interest. And this means that as well as self-evident allegiance to the goals and 
guiding values of a particular movement, it becomes possible to look, uncynically, at 
motivations for activism that might include kinship and status. A protest culture isn’t 
rendered inauthentic by its developing gatekeeping mechanisms, shibboleths and 
disciplinary regimes. 
 
In other words, this is simply being reflexive about our ways of knowing and talking 
about politics and protest. It is not a matter of demarcating academic and activist 
perspectives, and there is room in these volumes for how-to guides and encomia (de 
Bakker, in Uldam & Vestergaard; Uldam, in the same volume; Thorburn, in Trottier & 
Fuchs) alongside more critical accounts. We are well beyond the convention that only 
disinterested outsiders can produce valid insights into political movements, and that 
activists can only speak to the particular and not the universal. At the same time, 
however, and the parallel is intended in good faith, anthropologists researching fan 
communities face the dilemma of selecting populations with which they share a passion 
and feeling of belonging, or deliberately targeting a niche interest to which they are 
indifferent or actively hostile. The question arises because there is very little here on 
right-wing protest movements and their use of or emergence through social media. 
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Granted, there are those who argue that most such groups do not qualify as genuine 
grassroots protest movements insofar as they are at base elite exercises in astroturfing 
(Hay, 2011). But apart from one chapter on the neo-fascists in Greece (Kompatsiaris & 
Mylonas, in Trottier & Fuchs), which does not set out to investigate them as a protest 
movement as such but rather as social media-facilitated racist discourse – there is 
nothing on the Tea Party in the US, the Front National in France, the Sweden Democrats, 
the Party for Freedom in the Netherlands or Ukip. 
 
Epistemologies of protest, epistemologies of power 
 
Being reflexive about ways of knowing means taking seriously epistemology, which 
means in the first instance resisting reading the visible evidence of social media politics 
as standing for politics tout court. While important things happen on social media, it is 
not an elevated form of social knowledge. Resisting is difficult – because of the sheer 
amount of data available, because of the ease with which like-minded others can come 
together, mutually affirming that this is the centre of things, and because there is ample 
space for imagining. The last point is a crucial element in the evolution of new ways of 
being political, but it necessarily includes the possibility of projection. Now, projection is 
a dirty word, suggesting nothing more than seeing what you want to see in the face of 
whatever the reality is. But in practice the way that projection happens and is allowed to 
happen is complex, and certainly not reducible to an individual lack of rigour or acumen. 
Husted, in Uldam and Vestergaard, is strong on this point, detailing precisely how chains 
of equivalence emerge linking concrete goals to increasingly vague and interchangeable 
aspirations. It is a salient example of what can be learned from the weaknesses of 
protest movements as well as their strengths. Maintaining a healthy scepticism towards 
ways of knowing presented as universal likewise means suspending a thoroughgoing 
critical rendering of social media politics of the kind proposed by Fuchs and especially 
Andrejevic. Their models are compelling, with Fuchs arguing convincingly for the 
continued relevance of critical theory and Andrejevic for an insidious reading of 
Foucauldian governmentality. Redden in Dencik and Leistert derives much from the 
latter, and what results is theoretically cogent and well-argued. But it is also thoroughly 
discursive, a theorisation of protest whose premises necessitate their conclusions. 
 
As with any discourse, the means exist for pulling apart what makes it tick – how 
observed communication and behaviour is accorded the status of empirical evidence of 
theoretical models of media and power. The methodologies followed in these volumes 
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are appropriately various and not in the least doctrinaire (for an excellent example of 
methodology appropriately applied to its object of analysis, see Castelló & Barberá, in 
Uldam & Vestergaard), but in some cases methods seem to serve little purpose but to 
affirm rather than build theses, let alone test them. In particular, what is presented as 
knowledge of the social and interpreted as evidence that supports a Deleuzian 
perspective (Thorburn, in Trottier & Fuchs; Trottier in the same volume) is not self-
evidently meaningful on those terms. Working within a broadly Habermasian 
framework, Uldam and Vestergaard’s introduction fares better in this regard, perhaps 
because Habermas is more prescriptive in setting out criteria for what constitutes 
deliberation and deliberative spaces. This is not to suggest in any way that Deleuze 
operates in too abstract a realm for his models to be provable or disprovable, and other 
authors elsewhere (Best, 2010) have sought to put Deleuzian research on firmer 
epistemological ground. The solution is not a more positivist philosophy of science or 
the adoption of social scientific methodologies: Juris (2012) is ample evidence of what 
current anthropological thinking has to offer protest movement studies, for one. Haunss 
(in Dencik & Leistert) though is right to suggest that we would benefit from more 
longitudinal research in this field. For present purposes, what emerges is a valid, but 
contingent, set of knowledges instinctively meaningful and instinctively read in 
particular ways, a discourse in which it is a natural move to infer a minoritarian politics 
of becoming that consists in constitution rather than representation from a laudable 
campaign against a hike in student tuition fees (Thorburn, in Trottier & Fuchs). 
 
However that sounds, it is not meant to be simply critical: it shows that academic 
discourse too is about group membership. For whom are these instinctive inferential 
leaps to make, and why? This is important because group membership in academic 
discourse is rarely about shared methodologies – it is about politics. That is entirely 
appropriate, but we shouldn’t assume that epistemology naturally follows political 
conviction. And importantly, this elision becomes its own kind of gatekeeping 
mechanism. Another way of looking at the presentation of evidence in these volumes 
confirms this view. A lot of the papers give ample space over to the voices of individual 
protestors, often more or less unadulterated. This is a valid move in analytic and ethical 
terms, consistent with the ethnographic ethos of letting people speak for themselves, at 
least to the extent that this is possible within the production logics of the academic field. 
First, though, this is not the same as grounded theory, which sets out from the same 
principle of listening without prejudice to participants but tries to derive and not only 
confirm theoretical models on the basis of their words. And second, in many cases it is 
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assumed that what participants say is self-evident, as though there were only one way of 
hearing these words. Consider this, for instance, from a member of Ecologistas en Acción 
(from Barassi, in Dencik and Leistert): 
 
Everybody says that there is no censorship on the internet, or at least 
only in part. But that is not true. Online censorship is applied through the 
excess of banal content that distracts people from serious or collective 
issues. 
 
This is presented as an expression of information overload making it difficult for 
political messages to reach intended audiences, which it is. But it much else besides: that 
‘Everybody’ a clear relational positioning against conventional thought, a self-
authorisation; ‘banal content’ likewise valorising that which is defined against it; 
‘censorship’ and ‘distracts people’ hinting that there are dark forces at work. These 
words do not just express or describe, they enact a way of being political whose 
meaningfulness is not immediately transparent. 
 
There are particular words, too, which suggest a natural epistemology which except for 
field insiders is anything but: transgressive and radical, most conspicuously (see Fuchs, 
in Trottier & Fuchs; Uldam, in Uldam & Vestergaard). Again there is nothing strange or 
questionable about using these terms, but they are scattered about as though it is 
obvious what constitutes a radical or transgressive act (Uldam, for instance, suggests 
that criticising BP is transgressive). It is not clear here whether being transgressive or 
radical is like being pregnant – you either are or you aren’t – or if there is a sliding scale, 
and how this is calibrated. It isn’t pedantry to question the use of specific words: there is 
nothing disingenuous about them, but they appear to function among webs of ideas that 
are self-evident only within this part of the field. 
 
Two final big themes are worth teasing out a little. The first is violence. When it is 
described in these works, violence takes the form either of police brutality (Thorburn, in 
Trottier & Fuchs), or the exaggeration by media of violence in demonstrations (Cable, in 
Trottier & Fuchs). These are all important, but contingent on a specific reading of 
violence that is antithetical to the implied norms of progressive politics. The inference is 
that protest movements occupy the moral high ground, and it is their nefarious 
opponents – the state, the police, mainstream media – that resort to a- or immoral 
tactics to thwart them. First, this othering of violence has a clear function in terms of in-
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group solidarity, with collective identity made stronger in the face of adversity that is 
not only formidable but unjust. And second, there is a lot more going on in 
contemporary theorisations of violence, especially in sociology and philosophy, than is 
given an airing here. Key questions include not just whether violence is justifiable under 
certain conditions, but what violence actually is: a form of political communication, a 
kind of agency, and not just the opposite of voice, deliberation and subjectification. 
 
The second theme is technology, which in more than a few papers is written about in a 
way that is somewhat at odds with much of the current literature – with technology 
ascribed something approaching volition, and more contingently still, as something 
external to human agency that threatens to disrupt or destroy it. There is no need to 
reach for actor-network theory when discussing technical infrastructures, but 
unqualified claims such as “Human intentionality is superseded by the uncanny 
intentionality of the network” (Trottier, in Trottier & Fuchs) and to write of individuals 
“torn to pieces” by algorithms” (Lazzarato, quoted in Leistert, Dencik & Leistert) points 
to a conception of social media networks that is dehumanising. Again, fair enough (see 
especially Barassi’s persuasive application of Virilio in Dencik & Leistert, as well as 
Kaun’s call for politics to be slowed down in the same volume), but it is presented in 
several chapters as a universal, taken-for-granted perspective which, outside this 
discursive space, it is anything but.  
 
Conclusion: thinking beyond ways of thinking 
 
It is inevitable when we make inferences and generalisations that we risk reading too 
much into things, or not enough, or just read in ways that are deceptively narrow. 
Returning to Couldry’s point, this is anything but a dismissal of the wealth of 
perspectives on social media and protest delivered here: it is rather to flag up the risks 
associated with accepting that this evidence and these ways of interpreting it are who 
we are now. And while Couldry is referring to our collective values as communities and 
societies, there is a corollary that concerns the way we all live with and through media 
in our everyday lives. Phenomena such as the rapid adoption of new media devices and 
platforms, and our concomitant adaption to their architectures and rhythms, are 
important. We are enacting distinct, inevitably constrained and possibly complicit 
modes of subjectivity if we pay attention to or participate in protest with an always-
already orientation to visibility or shareability, or to group membership dependent on 
patterned, time-sensitive gestures rather than affiliation secured through more 
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traditional routes (Lovink & Rossiter, in Dencik & Leistert). It is history forgotten as 
history and thus deserving of methodical excavation. It might also matter if our 
reorientations are towards networks designed primarily with corporate profit in mind. 
But adapting to these affordances is not the same as subjection to the logics of 
capitalism. There may well be a link to flesh out, but it cannot be assumed that evidence 
of one is evidence of the other. 
 
Similarly, positing an equivalence between surveillance and the loss of free will 
(“Corporate platform users effectively have lost all control over their freedom of 
expression after their acceptance of corporate terms of services”, Leistert, in Dencik & 
Leistert) risks conflating the distinct epistemologies of each. If the two are related it is a 
complicated relationship, and though it is easy to say that it’s complicated, we can follow 
that through with a more detailed look at the different kinds of interpellation of partially 
implicated selves in all manner of concrete situations: stop and search, the codification 
of gendered victimhood in law, the designation of a political cause as a potentially threat 
to national security, and so on. There are chains of events to track, the things that 
happen when you are called forth by institutional discourse as risky, deviant or 
dangerous (see for instance Kaun, in Dencik & Leistert; Redden, in the same volume; 
Trottier on police surveillance in Trottier & Fuchs). But there is no seamless logical 
chain that ends with an existential threat to one’s political subjectivity. Indeed, there is 
every possibility collective identity is strengthened by being officially othered. 
 
It is common in this literature for outrage to be expressed, often stirringly, at police and 
state strategies aimed at controlling, delegitimising and opposing protest. The revelation 
that the police as well as multinational corporations have media tactics specifically 
designed to target activists – predicting activist violence without justification, inflating 
or understating protestors on demonstrations – is met with something like disbelief 
(Treré, in Dencik & Leistert, writes of the “dirty digital tricks” of official politics; see also 
Cable, in Trottier & Fuchs; and Lekakis, in Uldam & Vestergaard, on corporate CSR 
strategies that appropriate national ideals and rituals). But why would these institutions 
not have strategic communications strategies and strategists? The indignation is 
doubtless sincere rather than sanctimonious, but it is also a specifically moral relative 
positioning, and it is an illocutionary act of commitment and belonging (see especially 
Milan, in Dencik & Leistert). Drawing such an inference does not reduce everything to a 
simulation of solidarity: like any principle solidarity never just is, it has to be learned 
and embedded and enacted in particular ways across time and space. The same goes for 
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a tendency to personify institutions and states as a venal ‘they’ or repressive other (see 
for instance Fuchs, in Trottier & Fuchs; cf Poell in the same volume. Uldam, in Uldam & 
Vestergaard, refers to ‘BP’ as a sentence subject throughout – BP responds, contacts, 
monitors etc.), acting as sentient and univocal enemies rather than the sites of struggle 
and contestation they invariably are. To ask whether this is naïve or disingenuous 
misses the point: it is a political act insofar as it locates the speaker and creates 
possibilities for collective identification and action. It is a way of thinking about power 
that should not displace others, but is instructive in what it can tell us about how 
academic researchers as well as activists orient themselves towards the world 
politically, morally and tribally. 
 
The Trottier and Fuchs collection has ‘State’ in its title, and it is here that how it is 
conceptualised moves beyond the malevolent and intractable. Fuchs’ opening chapter 
rolls out an outstanding disciplinary and historical contextualisation of different ways of 
thinking about the state, and as such offers a valuable counterweight to the tendency in 
some parts of the literature to think of social media politics as being post-institutional 
(cf Uldam & Vestergaard, in Uldam & Vestergaard). Following Jessop (2007), Trottier 
and Fuchs situate the state between ‘majestic isolation’ and embeddedness in the wider 
political system: states may tend towards self-sustenance but are not intrinsic entities; 
they are relations of forces. The Uldam and Vestergaard volume does a similar service 
for thinking about corporations, with several chapters presenting research into 
corporate social responsibility in a manner that does not reduce it to propaganda. 
 
More generally, discourse around the media’s roles and functions is a little out of step 
with broader trends in media studies that have tended towards greater emphasis on 
audience experiences and at the macro level to thinking of media organisations and 
industries more in terms of chaos than control (McNair, 2003). Here, media hegemony is 
very much still the norm, with systematicity and orchestration taken as given in many of 
the chapters (see for instance de Bakker, in Uldam & Vestergaard). Occasionally this 
strays into the hypodermic syringe model of media that has been rendered marginal by 
recent research, with talk of media outlets ‘feeding’ their audiences untruths 
(Kompatsiaris & Mylonas, in Trottier & Fuchs). Again, this can be looked at in functional 
terms rather than simply dismissed as dated, with an implied valorisation of 
independent minority media. Likewise the tendency towards sweeping, agentless 
phrases like “The very use of online media and social networking by G20Meltdown was 
incorporated into the press’ narrative of fear” (Cable, in Trottier & Fuchs) speaks to a 
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coherent view but one that is nothing like as universally accepted as it is presumed to be 
– both the idea of an unseen agent or logic doing the incorporating, as well as the notion 
that there is a single, hegemonic narrative instilling fear and anxiety as a means of 
exerting control, have been consistently challenged for decades now.  
 
Apart from anything else, this kind of account absents entirely the people who do media 
work, most of whom would resist the charge that whatever they do is implicated in the 
maintenance of a media system efficiently designed for indoctrination. The people who 
do protest work, on the other hand, are brought vividly to life in these collections across 
a plethora of geographies and campaigns. What is most striking of all in their 
testimonies is their reflexivity about media framing and surveillance, the banal realism 
that constitutes the day-to-day doing of idealism, and the centrality of human 
relationships – as inspiring, as annoying, as work – to it all (see especially Della Porto & 
Mattoni, in Trottier & Fuchs; Treré, in Dencik & Leistert; Elmer, also Porto & Brant, in 
the same volume). It is this sense of the social that we academics should be careful not 
to lose sight of as novel ways of theorising social media politics solidify into convention. 
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